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 Wage Differential between Caste Groups: Are
Younger and Older Cohorts Different?
Abstract
Recent literature has provided evidence that a gender and caste-based wage discrimination
can exert negative economic impact on a country’s development process. Given the enor-
mous contribution of young population to India’s workforce, we examine whether there is
any caste-based discrimination considering ’demographic’ distinction. Using employment
and unemployment National Sample Survey data from India for two rounds during the last
two decades (1993 and 2010), we find rising wage gap between privileged and marginalized
groups within younger and older cohorts across the distribution and over time. Further-
more, we decompose the wage gap using the counterfactual decomposition into endowment
effect (explained by differences in characteristics) and a discrimination effect (attributable
to unequal returns to covariates). We find that the discrimination effect against marginal-
ized castes (in both cohorts) decreases, implying an increasing endowment effect across the
distribution of the wage gap. This discrimination effect is more pronounced among younger
compared to older cohorts.
Key Words: Caste discrimination; Demographic dividend, Young-old discrimination;
Quantile Regression; India.
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1 Introduction
Discrimination1 - practised often endogenously in both developing and developed societies, is
not known to beget any virtue either in the form of economic or social benefits. The economic
study of discrimination has been motivated, first, by the growth of labour supply having impli-
cations on the underutilization of valuable resources (Klasen, 2002), and second, by the expected
distortional incentives for investment for the next generation (Alderman and King, 1998). Both
factors have growth-inhibiting effects and trigger a rise in inequality traps, where a disadvan-
taged group faces a long-run opportunity set worse than that of another group, even though a
better set would be possible (Bourguignon et al., 2007). Undoubtedly, discrimination, prevalent
in the form of either caste, gender, or skin colour can lead to inefficient sub-optimal outcomes
(Esteve-Volart, 2009); increases social inequality which in effect can also lead to social alienation
in the society (Gupta et al., 2018).
In the context of a developing country such as India, the occurrence of discrimination is
mostly observed on the basis of caste2. It is found, using both field and survey data, that it
not only affects the current development path but also negatively impacts on the labour market
(Kijima 2006a; Thorat and Attewell 2007; and Azam 2012). There has been also an enormous
amount of media coverage that has noticed continuous practice of discrimination and violence
against low castes in India. These findings suggest that the caste system in India has a strong
impediment both in the labour market and social sphere that can create distortions in incentives
for next generation. Its continuous practice can offset the gains from the demographic dividend
that is the contribution of a specific population cohort, such as a young over old population.
In this spirit, Jaimovich and Siu (2009) using the U.S data have established that different age
composition of the labour force has a large and statistically significant volatility effect on the
business cycle.
Taken together, this paper expands the literature on the caste-based wage gap by focussing
on young and old demographics. A primary motivation of this choice is based on a number of
important research on demography (Bloom et al., 2003; Lindh and Malmberg, 2007; Crespo-
Cuaresma and Mishra, 2011; Parhi et al. 2013) which have established that a (developing)
country seeking to maintain a high growth momentum needs to endogenise fully the positive
externalities of demographic dividend. Aiyar and Mody (2013) offered support to this broad
proposition and demonstrated that a substantial portion of the growth experienced by India
since the 1980s is attributable to the countrys changing age composition. In view of these
findings, when a country like India experiences rare dividend from age-composition, a continuous
1Discrimination is defined as a systematic gap in rewards to key factors of production that can be attributed
not to differences in relevant attributes but to easily identifiable group characteristics based on e.g., gender, skin
colour or caste.
2In India, caste is broadly classified into four groups, namely Schedule Caste (SC), Scheduled Tribe (ST),
Other Backward Classes (OBC) and High Caste (HC). The first three groups are classified as underprivi-
leged/marginalized groups or low caste whereas the last group is classified as the privileged group or high caste.
Historically, the Scheduled Caste are the untouchable group and have socially been placed outside of the society
for centuries. The second group, Schedule Tribe, are a group whose distinction is made on the basis of language
and cultural activities from rest of the Indian society. These two groups were often not allowed to participate
in most of the economic decision-making process in India. The Other Backward Classes were classified as those
who were not the part of the former two groups and neither were part of the upper caste. This group is also
deprived, both socially and economically. These four groups represent approximately 20%, 8%, 42% and 30% of
the population of India respectively.
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discriminatory practice among them is likely to create social tensions and contribute to social
conflict in the society.
This paper aims to contribute to the existing literature in the three distinct ways. First,
we investigate whether the continuous practice of caste-based discrimination in the Indian labour
market, after the thirty years of the reform, has ameliorated the problem of discrimination in the
case of different demographic groups such as young and old cohorts. To the best of the authors
knowledge no such study exists that indicating the heated debate of caste discrimination for
these two demographics.
Second, the existing literature primarily concentrates on the average, with the exception
of Azam (2012) who studied wage inequality for the entire distribution using the consumption
expenditure data. However, the shortcoming of this recent literature is that it has only examined
for urban area and neglected rural area in the analysis. We fill this gap by including the rural
sample and examine caste based discrimination for the most recent period i.e., 2010-11. To
better understand the discriminatory practice we look at the entire wage distribution between
two groups; we examine using the counterfactual decomposition method proposed by Machado
and Mata (2005) and ask what would happen if lower caste young or old cohorts are given the
same wage structure as the high caste.
Third, as a robustness exercise, we use matching procedure and re-estimate the result ob-
tained from the counterfactual approach and correct for potential specification bias in unmatched
samples with individuals of different characteristics. In this case, we use the decomposition only
on the matched sample, enabling us to compare the matched results against the unmatched
ones using the same counterfactual decomposition method. We use the employment and unem-
ployment data from National Sample Survey (NSS) for two different survey periods. The first
sample period is 1993-94, which provides information on to the presence of discrimination before
or at the beginning of reform period. The second sample period is 2010-11, which is used to
examine the effect of discriminatory practices after the thirty years of the reform.
Our findings can be summarised as follows. The observed differences between young
marginalized groups and the privileged group have increased across the entire distribution from
1993-94 to 2010-11, and are more acute at the top of the wage distribution. A similar result
holds for older cohorts. Furthermore, by correcting the selection bias problem in each cohort, we
find that higher discrimination effect, 70-82% among young and 64-67% among older workers,
contributes to the total wage gap at the lower end of the wage distribution. Our finding sug-
gests that the adopted reservation policy, which was placed after independence to protect the
marginalized groups from discrimination practice, the results suggest that marginalized groups
from discrimination practise has not had its expected impact on reducing wage discrimination
against low castes, and in particular against low caste young cohorts.
The rest of this paper is as follow as: in Section 2, we present related literature and con-
textualize the same for the Indian context. Section 3 describes our methodological approaches.
In Section 4, we describe the data and present stylized observations. Section 5 provides the em-
pirical findings including robustness exercise. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the main findings
of the paper and discusses their implications for policy.
3
2 Related literature and context
In this section, we consider only those literature that is more relevant to Indian labour market
and is based on caste discrimination. Following this we also explain why the study of wage-gap
differential among young-old based on social identities (such as caste) is so important in the
Indian context.
2.1 Literature survey
The literature on discrimination has a deep facilitator in labour economics. Country specific
empirical studies have added various dimensions by identifying distinct social, economic and de-
mographic characteristics. From policy point of view, the most important reason for persistence
of discrimination is attributed to policy ineffectiveness. For instance, in the case of India, the
effort made by federal and state government to minimise the impact of caste based discrimina-
tion has appeared to be insufficient because in recent times the problem of discrimination has
moved from being a thoughtful social issue to becoming a nagging human rights issue (Borooah
et al. 2007). Research has shown that its occurrence is more visible in rural compared to urban
areas.
Caste discrimination in India is not new. This phenomenon has been seriously debated in
many international forums (European Commission, 2009). It is a cultural and social phenomenon
that has been a part of the traditions of the Indian society for thousands of years, dividing people
into castes in a hierarchical order based on their descent. Indeed, caste-based discrimination can
influence all spheres of life and can violate many basic human rights including civil, political,
social, economic and cultural rights. It is also a major obstacle to achieving development goals
because affected populations are often excluded from the development process. Discrimination
is practiced in many areas, such as housing, marriage, and general social interaction that are
reinforced through the practice and threat of social exclusion, economic boycotts, and even
physical violence.
Being based on deeply ingrained social structures, caste based discrimination is currently
part of day-to-day life in India. The effort made in recent years to reduce the impact of caste-
based discrimination by federal and state governments, such as legislation changes, seems to
have been proven insufficient and has moved from social issue to becoming a human rights issue.
Research has shown that occurrence of discriminatory practices, however, are more visible in
rural compared to urban areas. For instance, Kijima (2006a) using NSS data for the periods
1983-1999, has reported that the disparities of living standards among SC/ST (marginalized
groups) compared to non-SC/ST (privileged group) still remain very high.
Affirmative policies3 have been placed immediately after independence in India to increase
access to education and employment for marginalized groups (SC/ST) and more recently these
affirmative policies have been extended for another deprived group OBC. However, research on
3To reduce the social disparity and to improve the social and economic standards of the first three groups- SCs,
STs and OBCs, the Indian governments have created a specialized system called reservation policy or reservation
system. Reservation system was created to empower the social position of members of these groups by providing
some reserved seats in the administration, higher education, and elected bodies for their upliftment. Under the
provision of the reservation system, each state in India gets equality of opportunities in matters of employment
and education.
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caste discrimination has observed a failure of affirmative policies on many grounds. For instance,
Bhaumik and Chakrabarty (2006), using NSS employment-unemployment data for the urban
sector for the years 1987 and 1999, observed that the privileged group (HC) has enjoyed most
of the development compared to their counterpart (SC/ST) between 1987 and 1999. Using the
Oaxaca-Blinder (Oaxaca 1973; Blinder 1973; henceforth OB) decomposition method, they also
observed that differences in earning between these two groups were mainly due to differences
in returns to education. In other words, they identified that marginalized groups possess low
or medium educational attainment levels and return to education for these two groups is low,
which in part, contribute towards the wage gap between these groups.
Serious concerns have begun to emerge regarding the effect of discrimination on the return
to education and rising income inequality, especially after the beginning of the reform period.
Research has identified that urban areas have experienced rising income inequality. For instance,
Kijima (2006b), using four rounds of the NSS data conducted in 1983, 1987, 1993, and 1999
on employment and unemployment, has observed that both urban wage and wage inequality
between the advantaged group and the deprived groups has widened. However, his study does
not look at the entire wage distribution. Azam (2012) uses data from the 1980s through to
2004 and expands social groups into SC, ST and Muslims (religion) and analyses the overall
wage inequality in urban sectors. He argues that the increasing wage effect is mainly due to
the increasing effect of covariates (characteristics) over time. In a similar vein, Hnatkovskaet.
et al (2012) have observed that educational attainment levels, occupation choices, wages and
consumption levels among marginalized groups have started converging towards the privileged
group. However, the majority of the observed difference in wages between the two groups is
attributed to the difference in covariate.
The existing literature have successfully that marginalized groups are rewarded less com-
pared to the privileged group and they also posses inferior productivity augmenting characteris-
tics. However, these research have important limitations; (i) the inclusion of self-employed in the
analysis, (ii) restricted sample for either urban or rural area examined usually at the mean, (iii)
the application of quantile regression approach with counterfactual decomposition to untreated
samples, and (iv) and little insights on the persistence of discrimination in the treated samples.
These limitations from the literature form the basis of investigation in the present work.
Following this literature survey on caste based discrimination related to India, we next
explain why it is important from different demographic perspective such as young and old in
our case.
2.2 Discrimination and demographic distintion
The practice of discrimination in India, as explained in the previous section, has a deep tra-
ditional/historical root. Although identifying people with respect to castes (in a hierarchical
order) based on their descent has been a part of the cultural and social phenomenon of the
Indian society for thousands of years, it has experienced a strong emergence in the post-colonial
period. There are at least two leading reasons why the study of wage-gap differential among
young-old and social identities (such as caste) is so important in the Indian context.
1. Social identities
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In an interesting research with respect to household consumption behaviour, Khamis et
al. (2012) demonstrated that consumption pattern in India is significantly determined by
caste and religious affiliations. As such, (prevalence of) discrimination not only affects
individuals social identities but also may germinate social tensions (leading to social alien-
ation) in the long-run. In a number of studies, both in sociology and economics, it has
been repeatedly claimed that rising social tensions in India in recent years is an outcome
of continuous discrimination in wage-reward (for instance, Deininger et al., 2012). In a
related research, Hnatkovska et al. (2012) also documented the associations between dis-
crimination, anger, and delinquency; investigating whether aggressive behaviors emerge
over time as a consequence of perceived discrimination. The authors found that adoles-
cents who engage in aggressive behavior perceive that they are being discriminated against.
Perceived discrimination is but one of many strains related to the unequal social position
that youths of some societies may experience, and it has important implications for the
proliferation of disparities in later life. Moreover, the stagnant role of caste discrimination
(similar to race-relationship) in the Indian labour market has also widened the income and
employment gap between deprived groups and privileged groups over time (Madheswaran
and Attewell, 2007).
2. Growth effect via demographic pressure
Additionally, the prevalence of discrimination may exert significant negative effects on eco-
nomic growth especially when the economy is in a transitional path. At a time when an
economy is poised to experience high growth momentum, persistent of discrimination can
translate into unstable and uncertain economic growth (see Deshpande, 2007 for analysis
during the liberalization period). This is nowhere more true than in the case of India
where demographers have been advising that the positive externalities from demographic
dividend need to be tapped to translate the growth of young population into a sustain-
able long-run stable economic growth. Indeed, a recent UN report on Population Fund
(UNPFA) shows that currently there are 356 million 10-24 year-olds in India, which is
about 28% of Indias total population. While a monotonic growth of young population is
necessary to continually push Indias growth trajectory continuous discrimination among
young population can have the distortionary effect on economic growth via productivity
dynamics where the latter is influenced by rising social tension.
3 Methodology: Counetrfactual decomposition with distribu-
tional heterogeneity
In this section, we summarize the main methodological tool leading to our empirical investiga-
tion. To understand the wage differential between privileged and marginalized groups, the basic
method is to decompose the observed wage differentials into those attributable to productivity
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or observed characteristics and those in the return to specific attributes, which are interpreted
as endowment and discrimination effect respectively (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973). To illustrate
our point, let individual wage (log) for upper caste be whc, and that of the lower caste wlc. We
thus have wage equation for each group as follow:
whc = βhcxhc + hc (1)
and
wlc = βlcxlc + lc (2)
where x is a vector of individual characteristics that determines potential wage in each group,
βs are coefficients to be estimated and  is iid error term for each group. The vector of explana-
tory variables controls for human capital, demographic and various other observed individual
characteristics. Due to the assumption of iid error, the covariates x in each group hc and lc
can be consistently estimated using OLS. The average wage difference between hc and lc can be
calculated as;
whc − wlc = βˆhcxhc − βˆlc)xlc (3)
we assume, in the absence of the discrimination the low caste group would be paid accord-
ing to high caste returns, while keeping their own characteristics. This yields a hypothetical
(counterfactual) distribution, βˆhcxlc. By adding and substracting this term we get;
whc − wlc = βˆhcxhc − βˆhcxlc + βˆhcxlc − βˆlcxlc
= βˆhc(xhc − xlc) + (βˆhc − βˆlc)xlc (4)
The first term on the right-hand side of the above equation corresponds to the caste wage
differential arising from differences in characteristics normally representing the endowment effect.
The second term denotes the discrimination component that arises from wage differentials due
to different returns to these characteristics. Using equation 4, we observe the wage gap between
high caste and low caste for each period and each cohort (i.e., young and old).
The OB approach measures discrimination at the mean and thus ignores the information
content in the rest of the distribution. Machado and Mata (2005) extended OB decomposition
to account for distributional heterogeneity and thus extended the estimation of discrimination
effects at various quantiles of the wage distribution. Under this decomposition approach, con-
ditional quantile regression for each group can be presented as:
Qθ(w|x) = x′βτ (θ) (5)
where τ= hc, lc and βτ (θ) is a vector of the quantile regression coefficient for social group τ .
Under the probability integral transformation theorem, the estimated parameter can be used to
simulate the conditional distribution of w given x for each social group. If θ is a uniform random
variables [0,1], then F−1(θ) has the distribution F. Thus, if θ1, θ2, θ3 . . . θm, the corresponding m
7
are drawn from a uniform (0,1) distribution, the corresponding m estimates of the conditional
quantiles of wage distribution w at xi, wˆ = x
′
iβ(θ)
m
i=1 , constitute a random sample from the
(estimated) conditional distribution of wage at given x. To integrate x out and get a sample from
the marginal distribution, instead of keeping x fixed at a given value, a random sample can be
drawn from appropriate distribution. Using the above counterfactual approach (equation 4) the
MM decomposition can be written as follow (The detailed counterfactual steps are summarized
in the Appendix):
f(whc)− f(wlc) = f∗(whc;xlc)− f∗(wlc)︸ ︷︷ ︸
coefficient effect
+ f∗(whc)− f∗(whc;xlc)︸ ︷︷ ︸
covariate effect
+residual (6)
The first term on the right-hand side in the above equation is commonly referred to as the
coefficient component and can be interpreted as a measure of the wage advantage (differential)
enjoyed by upper caste workers compared to lower caste workers. The coefficient component
indicates the degree to which characteristics of employees in the upper and lower caste are
rewarded differently relative to a baseline wage structure at each quantile. The second term on
the right-hand side represents the characteristic component and is a measure of the difference
in the (logarithm of) weekly earnings of upper and lower caste employees at each quantile that
can be attributable to differences in the characteristics.
The counterfactual decomposition as described above explains how one can compute the
wage gap between two groups across the distribution. However, one of the potential problem
with the underlying model is that it does not account for misspecification due to differences
in support of the empirical distribution of individual characteristics between two groups. In
order to mitigate this problem, we use N˜opo (2008) proposed matching algorithm. The reason
for using the N˜opo’s matching approach rather than propensity matching scores is that this
approach allows for the counterfactual mean wage to be simulated for the common support, thus
implying that no assumption on the out-of-support is required. Another reason for using this
matching approach is that N˜opo matching provides matched sample with ”similar” observable
characteristics (or a linear combination of them) in a non-parametric setting, i.e., the conditional
probability of receiving the treatment given the covariates, rather than directly for the covariates.
Under this assumption, this reduces the problem of ’curse of dimensionality’ that often arises
when controlling for multidimensional covariates in propensity matching. More importantly,
N˜opo matching in contrast to propensity score often approximates random matching but in the
N˜opo matching this is not the case (see Frolich et al 2015, Fan et. al 2016, Bhaltra et. al 2016
for more discussion). The details steps for the N˜opo matching approach is presented in the
Appendix.
We apply this matching approach for both young and old groups separately to remove the
misspecification due to differences in support of the empirical distribution individual character-
istics between two groups and re-run the counterfactual decomposition approach as a robustness
test of our counterfactual results. The descriptive statistics of the covariate after matching is
presented in Section 5.1.
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4 Data characteristics
To analyse discriminatory practices in Indian labour market we use employment unemployment
data from the National Sample Survey (NSS) for the periods 1993-94 and 2010-11. The survey
on employment and unemployment4 is the prime source of statistical indicators in India. These
surveys provide individual earnings and other demographic indicators such as education, age,
sex as well as occupation and industry. Our variable of interest is the difference in variability
in log wage5 (in real terms) across social strata and over time. Educational status is proxied by
educational attainment and represented by dummy variables no education, primary, secondary,
and tertiary. Other control variables include age, sex, marital status and regions. In order to
assess the effect of discrimination among all social groups, we restrict our sample to working
population aged 18-65, who actively participates in the labor market and thus report their
earnings per week from their usual principal activity6.
In Table [1] we present descriptive statistics for these two selected periods. In 1993, we can
distinguish two low caste groups SC and ST and compare them to their counterpart HC. However
the second period i.e., 2010-11 includes an additional marginalized group Other Backward Class
7 (OBC) in the analysis.
In Table [1], we observe that the weekly log wage has significantly increased over time
among all social groups. It seems that the growth and unprecedented trade liberalization poli-
cies of the 1990s in India have significantly affected the employment structure. As a result, it
has given rise to perceptible wage inequality among the privileged group and socially deprived
groups. In this context, previous studies also observe that in recent years wage inequality in
India has mostly increased among social groups in urban sectors Kijima (2006 a & b), Mad-
heswaran and Attewell (2007) . The other obvious change noted is the reduction in lower levels
of educational attainment for all castes and increasing proportion in secondary and university
level (graduate) education attainment. This is probably associated with return to education, in
favour of high-level occupations observed in the case of managerial occupation.
In Figure 1, we plot the wage distribution for different groups to show the variability in
their wage profiles, whereas in Figure 2 we plot the wage distribution with respect to demographic
4Previous research on discrimination employ a variety of data (Kijima (2006b) and Azam (2012)) using,
for example, per capita consumption expenditure (PCE) probably guided by their objective examined welfare
gains and differentials across gender and social strata. However, per capita, consumption expenditure data has
an important limitation which can be ameliorated by using employment data. Consumption expenditure data
normally measures how expenditure is distributed among two social groups/classes, however, there may also be
inter-group taste differences that affect consumption patterns. This ignores the monetary values attached to
expenditure that an individual receives for other economic activities, which otherwise can represent welfare gains
in quantifiable terms.
5In order to adjust the effect of inflation over time, we have used Maharastra poverty line as a benchmark to
convert wage earning in real terms (see Hnatovska et al. (2012)
6The principal activity is the activity in which a person is found during a reference period.
7The Other Backwards Class were classified as those who were not part of the former two groups and neither
part of the other caste, but they were deprived both socially and economically. This group came into the system
after the Mandal Commission submitted a report to the government in 1999. Prior to 1999, this group was merged
with High Caste or Privilege group.
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Figure 1: Wage distribution among all social groups
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distinction, viz., young and old in their respective groups and over time. We believe that the
density plot can be interpreted as a wage trap since there is a high degree of overlap in the lower
modes of the wage distribution.
Figure 2: Wage distribution among Young and Old cohorts
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This suggests the presence of multiple equilibria where the economy chooses to remain in
the lower-equilibria offering low-wage structure to low caste and to both cohorts. This lends
economic sense because the persistence of unequal earnings and labor force participation in
the economy needs to be ameliorated through redistribution which is purported to benefit the
disadvantaged class at the priority. As long as, the convergence of disadvantaged classes does not
occur with advantaged or high-class group’s wage distribution, the equilibrium at the high-mode
will remain non-stationary.
The visual inspection reveals the following: the wage distribution depicts higher variability
at the tail of the distribution. It does not confirm that wage distribution in one group compares
to another group in terms of some measure of location intended to reflect the wage gap. To
confirm this, we also perform the significant test across the distribution, as proposed by Wilcox
and Hurn (2014), between high castes (HC) and low castes (SC, ST and OBC). We found a
significant8 wage differential across the distribution between groups and over time.
5 Empirical results
In this section, we analyse the trend of caste discrimination across the wage distribution and show
why mean-based approach and unmatched samples are not the best to understand differences
between two groups. From Indian labour perspective, we emphasise that under the compliance of
the government affirmative policies, the effect of caste discrimination, if it exists, should fall over
time. Specifically, we are most interested in analysing how caste discrimination has moved from
the beginning of the reform period and has shaped the discriminatory practice until now. We
further extend this analysis for young and old cohorts separately and look at the discriminatory
effect between privileged and marginalized groups. For robustness, we use matching approach
and re-run the counterfactual decomposition approach.
In order to examine our contention and as a starting point, we first estimate the pres-
ence of discrimination using OB method as a baseline model to show the average change in
discrimination between groups and among young and old cohorts over time.
5.1 Caste based discrimination over time - OB Decomposition
Table (2) depicts the results obtained from OB decomposition method among all male aged
18-65 and between younger and older cohorts in different social groups.
We first examine the average wage gap between privileged and marginalized groups (Panel-
A) and among young and old cohorts (Panel B) over time. We observe that the overall wage
gap between privileged and marginalized groups has increased in the period 2011 compared to
1994. A similar trend is also observed for young and old cohorts. In terms of percentage change
in wage gap, we find that this has been widened from the period 1993 to 2011 by 22% and by
41% between HC vs SC and HC vs ST respectively. We find a similar trend in the wage gap
among young and old cohorts. Interestingly, our results show that young cohorts in both groups
(SC and ST) are rewarded less in the labour market (see the explained column of Table 2, and
therefore experiencing higher wage gap compared to old cohorts. For example, young cohorts
8These tests are available on the request from the corresponding author.
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(HC vs SC) characteristics effect in the period 1993 accounts for three-quarter of the total wage
gap, whereas in the period it has declined from 72% to 56% of total wage. A similar effect has
been noticed between HC and another group ST.
Although, we marked a sharp increase in the wage gap between privileged and marginalized
groups using the OB method, however, decomposing the overall wage gap between covariate
(explained part) and return to labour market characteristics (unexplained part) does not provide
an evidence of increasing discriminatory practises between these two groups. In fact, we find a
rise in discrimination effect among young and old cohorts. Bhaumik and Chakrabarty (2006),
using NSS data for the urban sector and for the period 1987 and 1999 have not also identified
any discrimination along caste arguments.
Our results, at this stage, shows that the average wage gap between privileged and
marginalized groups has not only widened, but it has also provided a strong evidence of dis-
criminatory practices among young cohorts compared to old, and over time. Understanding the
rise in the wage gap between privileged and marginalized groups and to what extent rise in the
wage gap characterise the discriminatory practices in the labour market, remains a critical pol-
icy concern in India, especially after the implementation of reservation policy. Various studies
have focused on this aspect, however, these studies have examined the wage gap at mean level
(Kijima, 2006 a and b). Only a few have examined this issue by using QR approach under
counterfactual distribution approach (Azam, 2012 and Hnatkovska et. al, 2012).
The previous studies, however, have neglected two issues. First, the mean-based approach,
such as the OB decomposition method does not cover the entire distribution conditional on
individual characteristics. Therefore, it does not help us to obtain a complete picture of the
discrimination affecting the labor market such as one can observe using the QR method. Second,
it is often the case that the individual lies may be at both ends of the wage distribution may have
different taste and preferences thus possible that they experience different level of discrimination.
It is, therefore, important that one should use the complete distribution and match the sample
according to individual characteristics. hence, we next use the matching approach, as suggested
by N˜opo (2008), and use the counterfactual decomposition method across the distribution as
proposed by Machado and Mata (2005) and investigate the overall wage gap and contribution
towards discrimination between privileged and marginalized groups and for both cohorts for the
entire distribution.
13
T
ab
le
2:
O
ax
a
ca
-B
li
n
d
er
d
ec
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
fo
r
1
9
9
3
-9
4
a
n
d
2
0
1
0
-1
1
H
C
v
s
S
C
H
C
v
s
S
T
H
C
v
s
O
B
C
ga
p
ex
p
la
in
ed
u
n
ex
p
la
in
ed
g
a
p
ex
p
la
in
ed
u
n
ex
p
la
in
ed
g
a
p
ex
p
la
in
ed
u
n
ex
p
la
in
ed
P
a
n
e
l-
A
A
ll
19
93
-9
4
0.
52
8
0.
40
5
0.
12
3
0
.3
9
1
0
.2
7
2
0
.1
2
0
-
-
-
(0
.0
05
1)
(0
.0
07
0
)
(0
.0
0
8
2
)
(0
.0
0
9
5
)
76
.7
2
23
.2
8
6
9
.4
6
3
0
.5
4
20
10
-1
1
0.
64
1
0.
50
3
0.
13
8
0
.5
5
1
0
.4
0
5
0
.1
4
6
0
.4
9
6
0
.3
7
6
0
.1
1
9
(0
.0
12
4)
(0
.0
09
6
)
(0
.0
1
7
4
)
(0
.0
1
1
4
)
(0
.0
1
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
9
2
)
78
.5
1
21
.4
9
7
3
.5
3
2
6
.4
7
7
5
.9
3
2
4
.0
7
P
a
n
e
l-
B
1
Y
o
u
n
g
19
93
-9
4
0.
43
3
0.
31
4
0.
12
0
0
.2
8
7
0
.1
8
7
0
.1
0
1
-
-
-
(0
.0
05
5)
(0
.0
08
0
)
(0
.0
0
8
9
)
(0
.0
1
0
6
)
72
.3
5
27
.6
4
6
4
.9
9
3
5
.0
1
20
10
-1
1
0.
56
7
0.
31
8
0.
25
0
0
.4
8
5
0
.1
9
4
0
.2
9
1
0
.3
9
6
0
.2
0
0
0
.1
9
6
(0
.0
14
0)
(0
.0
18
0
)
(0
.0
1
9
2
)
(0
.0
2
2
9
)
(0
.0
1
2
0
)
(0
.0
1
5
4
)
55
.9
9
44
.0
1
4
0
.0
5
5
9
.9
5
5
1
.5
2
4
9
.4
8
P
a
n
e
l-
B
2
O
ld
19
93
-9
4
0.
70
0
0.
61
8
0.
08
2
0
.6
0
4
0
.4
3
5
0
.1
6
9
-
-
-
(0
.0
10
7)
(0
.0
12
8
)
(0
.0
1
7
3
)
(0
.0
2
0
0
)
88
.3
1
11
.6
9
6
9
.8
2
3
0
.1
8
20
10
-1
1
0.
82
3
0.
49
8
0.
32
6
0
.5
7
7
0
.2
4
6
0
.3
1
2
0
.6
3
5
0
.4
1
0
0
.2
2
4
(0
.0
22
6)
(0
.0
28
4
)
(0
.0
3
3
1
)
(0
.0
3
6
9
)
(0
.0
1
9
3
)
(0
.0
2
3
2
)
60
.4
6
39
.5
4
4
4
.0
4
5
5
.9
6
6
4
.6
7
3
5
.3
3
N
o
te
:
(i
)
b
o
o
ts
tr
a
p
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
is
a
n
d
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
to
o
b
se
rv
ed
g
a
p
a
re
m
en
ti
o
n
ed
u
n
d
er
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
.
(i
i)
C
a
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s
a
re
n
o
t
p
o
ss
ib
le
d
u
e
to
u
n
av
a
il
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
O
B
C
d
a
ta
.
14
Figure 3: Wage gap before and after matching
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Before proceeding to explore QR results, in Figure 3 we present the unconditional wage
distribution between both groups in matched and unmatched sample, and the matched covariates
in Table 3. Despite the sharp rise in wage across groups and increasing participation rate in all
occupational categories, as we observed in Table 1, the patterns for both matched and unmatched
samples at different quantiles suggest that differences between two groups have widened over
time. In other words, the widened gap between both groups give an indication of less success of
reservation policies and thus give an indication that both marginalized groups (SC and ST) are
still facing discriminatory practice in the labour market.
5.2 Caste based discrimination over time - the MM decomposition
Although, the graphical pattern in Figure 3 has revealed higher wage differential between groups
at different quantiles, we have not yet examined what proportion of this wage gap is explained
by individual characteristics and unexplained across the wage distribution. We therefore use
the QR approach to study the overall wage gap for the entire distribution and contrast our
results for both matched and unmatched samples. The motivation to use the QR under MM
decomposition has been discussed in detail in our methodology section. Using this method, we
are able to assess the complete wage gap across the distribution, and the extent the overall wage
gap is contributed to covariate and coefficient effect in the labour market.
In Table 4, we present the results of counterfactual distribution obtained by MM decom-
position for both matched and unmatched sample. We do this by estimating a series of quantile,
but to save the space, we only report lower (10th), middle (50th), and higher (90th) quantile
results. In comparison to OB results (see, Table 2), these results show vast differences in the
wage gap between privileged and marginalized groups across the distribution. We observe that
in both samples (unmatched and matched) the wage gap has not only widened from lower to
higher quantile but also shows a strong evidence of discrimination (unexplained part) at the
median quantile compared to both lower and higher quantiles. Additionally, the overall wage
gap and discrimination effect between both privileged and marginalized groups are larger in
2011 compared to 1993. For instance, comparing the unexplained part between HC and SC, in
the period 1993 and in the unmatched sample, we observe only 16% increase in discrimination
at 90th quantile, whereas in the period 2011, we observe that it has increased by approximately
threefold (45%) from the period 1993. A similar trend can be observed when the sample is
matched and for all groups.
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Results obtained from both matched and unmatched sample are interesting and raise
important concerns e.g., what are the important factors that could explain for higher discrimi-
nation in the Indian labour market. One explanation could be the occupational choices between
the groups especially at lower quantiles in the marginalized groups. For instance, individuals
from the marginalized groups (especially the poor in terms of income) choose the occupation for
which human capital is not very important to reward their work at the labour market. Therefore
they avoid jobs requiring large investment in skills that are unique to a particular occupational
category because the return to specific attributes is reaped only if they stay longer in the same
occupation. In this view, Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006), showed that marginalized groups who
have been historically involved in the lower end of the labour-market are less likely to prefer
investment in human capital and hence more likely to be discriminated by others in the work-
place. Another potential reason could be higher social distance, higher poverty and economic
inequality in marginalized groups which leads to higher discriminatory practice in the labour
market for marginalized groups.
So far, we have analyzed the overall wage gap between two groups and the persistent
discriminatory effect between the groups. However, one of the important aspect of this paper,
and as a robustness test for main results, is to reveal the presence of discriminatory practice
among young and old cohorts in the light of reservation policies, that was aimed to improve the
participation in the labour force for deprived and privileged classes by way of reserving seats in
various public places, e.g., in jobs, education, and other fields of life. However, these reservation
policies are not directed towards different age groups. It is, therefore, interesting to study the
potential effect of discrimination among the young (18-40 years) and the old (41- 65 years).
In Table 5 and 6, we present the results of the counterfactual distribution obtained by
MM decomposition for both matched and unmatched samples for younger and older cohorts
over time. First, comparing the overall wage gap for both cohorts and over time, our results
provide strong evidence of a rise in the wage gap among both cohorts across the distribution.
This confirms the validity of OB results. More importantly, we observed that this has not only
increased over time but has been acuter among young cohorts when compared to old cohorts
and in unmatched sample. Our main interest, however, lies in examining the unexplained part
of the wage decomposition. From our results, it is clearly evident that there is the presence of
higher discriminatory practices on both lower and middle quantiles compared to higher quantile
and this has increased over time between privileged and marginalized groups for both cohorts.
In the existing literature, there is little evidence on the extent to which the young cohorts
are subject to discrimination There are several possibilities for higher wage gap and persistent
discrimination among young compared to old cohorts. One possible reason could be a difference
in skills, i.e. younger cohorts are less qualified than older cohorts.A second reason could be linked
to the consequent policy response in federal and state employment process which is often not the
same case in private employment. Third reason could be possibly linked to informal economy
where discriminatory practices are more often difficult to control through the legal mechanism
such as the reservation policies. Last but not least, this could be linked with the unemployment
penalty rate among young cohorts which might contribute to higher wage discrimination by the
potential employer.
19
T
a
b
le
5
:
C
o
u
n
te
rf
a
c
tu
a
l
d
e
c
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
a
t
se
le
c
te
d
q
u
a
n
ti
le
s
fr
o
m
1
9
9
3
-9
4
th
ro
u
g
h
2
0
1
0
-1
1
a
m
o
n
g
y
o
u
n
g
H
C
v
s
S
C
H
C
v
s
S
T
H
C
v
s
O
B
C
g
a
p
e
x
p
la
in
e
d
u
n
e
x
p
la
in
e
d
re
si
d
u
a
l
g
a
p
e
x
p
la
in
e
d
u
n
e
x
p
la
in
e
d
re
si
d
u
a
l
g
a
p
e
x
p
la
in
e
d
u
n
e
x
p
la
in
e
d
re
si
d
u
a
l
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
(1
2
)
U
n
m
a
t
c
h
e
d
1
9
9
3
-9
4
1
0
th
0
.2
2
3
0
.1
8
8
0
.0
3
4
0
.0
0
1
0
.2
2
1
0
.1
3
2
0
.0
5
0
0
.0
4
2
-
-
-
-
(0
.0
4
3
6
)
(0
.0
4
3
4
)
(0
.0
4
3
0
)
(0
.0
4
2
6
)
8
4
.1
0
1
5
.4
6
0
.4
4
5
9
.1
6
2
2
.2
2
1
8
.6
2
5
0
th
0
.3
3
6
0
.3
0
4
0
.0
8
9
-0
.0
5
7
0
.3
7
0
0
.1
9
9
0
.1
7
0
0
.0
0
0
-
-
-
-
(0
.0
2
8
4
)
(0
.0
2
3
5
)
(0
.0
2
7
7
)
(0
.0
2
5
7
)
9
0
.4
9
2
6
.3
7
-1
6
.8
6
5
3
.8
6
4
6
.0
3
0
.1
1
9
0
th
0
.6
2
4
0
.5
0
2
0
.1
1
5
0
.0
0
8
0
.2
1
1
0
.2
1
2
0
.0
2
0
-0
.0
2
2
-
-
-
-
(0
.0
4
2
1
)
(0
.0
3
6
8
)
(0
.0
3
8
9
)
(0
.0
4
2
5
)
8
0
.3
5
1
8
.3
9
1
.2
6
1
0
0
.8
1
9
.4
0
-1
0
.2
1
2
0
1
0
-1
1
1
0
th
0
.3
3
6
0
.1
3
9
0
.2
3
0
-0
.0
3
2
0
.3
7
7
0
.1
2
5
0
.3
0
6
-0
.0
5
4
0
.2
2
3
0
.0
8
3
0
.1
8
5
-0
.0
4
5
(0
.0
4
6
7
)
(0
.0
4
8
8
)
(0
.0
4
2
1
)
(0
.0
4
0
0
)
(0
.0
4
4
3
)
(0
.0
4
4
7
)
4
1
.2
9
6
8
.2
8
-9
.5
7
3
3
.1
7
8
1
.2
0
-1
4
.3
7
3
7
.1
6
8
2
.7
8
-1
9
.9
4
5
0
th
0
.4
3
1
0
.2
1
9
0
.2
2
9
-0
.0
1
7
0
.4
2
3
0
.1
8
3
0
.2
6
9
-0
.0
2
9
0
.3
5
7
0
.1
4
9
0
.1
9
5
0
.0
1
3
(0
.0
2
5
8
)
(0
.0
2
0
9
)
(0
.0
2
7
3
)
(0
.0
2
7
4
)
(0
.0
2
9
0
)
(0
.0
2
3
4
)
5
0
.8
3
5
3
.1
5
-3
.9
8
4
3
.3
2
6
3
.4
9
-6
.8
1
4
1
.7
3
5
4
.5
8
3
.6
9
9
0
th
0
.9
8
1
0
.5
8
1
0
.4
4
5
-0
.0
4
5
0
.4
7
0
0
.3
4
7
0
.2
2
7
-0
.1
0
5
0
.6
4
4
0
.3
6
6
0
.2
9
4
-0
.0
1
6
(0
.0
4
9
9
)
(0
.0
4
3
3
)
(0
.0
5
1
6
)
(0
.0
5
8
4
)
(0
.0
4
9
8
)
(0
.0
4
8
7
)
5
9
.2
1
4
5
.3
4
-4
.5
5
7
3
.8
8
4
8
.4
0
-2
2
.2
8
5
6
.7
5
4
5
.6
9
-2
.4
4
M
a
t
c
h
e
d
1
9
9
3
-9
4
1
0
th
0
.2
2
3
0
.1
8
6
0
.0
6
4
-0
.0
2
7
0
.1
8
2
0
.0
4
7
0
.1
7
0
-0
.0
3
4
-
-
-
-
(0
.0
3
9
)
(0
.0
3
5
)
(0
.0
4
7
)
(0
.0
4
7
)
8
4
2
9
-1
2
2
6
9
3
-1
9
5
0
th
0
.3
5
7
0
.2
1
4
0
.0
8
1
0
.0
6
1
0
.2
2
3
0
.1
2
2
0
.1
3
5
-0
.0
3
4
-
-
-
-
(0
.0
2
6
)
(0
.0
2
3
)
(0
.0
2
6
)
(0
.0
2
1
)
6
0
2
3
1
7
5
5
6
0
-1
5
9
0
th
0
.5
5
6
0
.4
3
9
0
.1
2
7
-0
.0
0
9
0
.3
5
7
0
.3
0
7
0
.1
7
4
-0
.1
2
4
(0
.0
3
6
)
(0
.0
3
8
)
(0
.0
3
7
)
(0
.0
4
9
)
-
-
-
-
7
9
2
3
-2
8
6
4
9
-3
5
2
0
1
0
-1
1
1
0
th
0
.2
8
7
0
.0
6
1
0
.2
2
8
-0
.0
0
2
0
.5
6
0
0
.0
6
3
0
.4
5
6
0
.0
4
1
0
.3
5
7
0
.0
6
4
0
.2
4
9
0
.0
4
3
(0
.0
4
7
)
(0
.0
4
9
)
(0
.0
5
6
)
(0
.0
4
9
)
(0
.0
4
4
)
(0
.0
3
7
)
2
1
8
0
-1
1
1
8
2
7
1
8
7
0
1
2
5
0
th
0
.2
8
8
0
.0
9
9
0
.1
8
4
0
.0
0
4
0
.4
4
6
0
.0
8
0
0
.3
6
7
0
.0
0
0
0
.1
8
2
0
.0
5
7
0
.1
7
8
-0
.0
5
4
(0
.0
2
0
)
(0
.0
1
9
)
(0
.0
3
3
)
(0
.0
2
6
)
(0
.0
2
4
)
(0
.0
2
3
)
3
5
6
4
1
1
8
8
2
0
3
2
9
8
-2
9
9
0
th
0
.5
1
4
0
.2
5
4
0
.3
3
4
-0
.0
7
4
0
.3
4
1
0
.1
0
8
0
.5
0
0
-0
.2
6
7
0
.4
5
7
0
.2
3
9
0
.3
2
6
-0
.1
0
8
(0
.0
4
0
)
(0
.0
5
4
)
(0
.0
4
7
)
(0
.1
1
4
)
(0
.0
4
1
)
(0
.0
5
1
)
4
9
6
5
-1
4
3
2
1
4
7
-7
8
5
2
7
1
-2
4
N
o
te
:
(i
)
b
o
o
ts
tr
a
p
st
a
n
d
a
rd
e
rr
o
rs
a
re
in
p
a
re
n
th
e
si
s
a
n
d
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
to
o
b
se
rv
e
d
g
a
p
a
re
m
e
n
ti
o
n
e
d
u
n
d
e
r
st
a
n
d
a
rd
e
rr
o
rs
.
(i
i)
†-
c
a
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s
a
re
n
o
t
p
o
ss
ib
le
d
u
e
to
u
n
a
v
a
il
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
O
B
C
d
a
ta
.
20
T
a
b
le
6
:
C
o
u
n
te
rf
a
c
tu
a
l
d
e
c
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
a
t
se
le
c
te
d
q
u
a
n
ti
le
s
fr
o
m
1
9
9
3
-9
4
th
ro
u
g
h
2
0
1
0
-1
1
a
m
o
n
g
o
ld
H
C
v
s
S
C
H
C
v
s
S
T
H
C
v
s
O
B
C
g
a
p
e
x
p
la
in
e
d
u
n
e
x
p
la
in
e
d
re
si
d
u
a
l
g
a
p
e
x
p
la
in
e
d
u
n
e
x
p
la
in
e
d
re
si
d
u
a
l
g
a
p
e
x
p
la
in
e
d
u
n
e
x
p
la
in
e
d
re
si
d
u
a
l
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
(1
2
)
U
n
m
a
t
c
h
e
d
1
9
9
3
-9
4
1
0
th
0
.2
8
8
0
.3
2
5
0
.0
4
1
-0
.0
7
9
0
.3
5
7
0
.2
2
3
0
.2
0
7
-0
.0
7
3
-
-
-
-
(0
.0
4
4
8
)
(0
.0
3
8
4
)
(0
.0
4
4
8
)
(0
.0
4
9
8
)
1
1
3
.0
3
1
4
.4
0
-2
7
.4
4
6
2
.5
1
5
7
.9
1
-2
0
.4
2
5
0
th
0
.9
1
6
0
.7
7
5
0
.0
8
5
0
.0
5
6
0
.9
1
6
0
.5
6
9
0
.2
1
2
0
.1
3
5
-
-
-
-
(0
.0
4
0
8
)
(0
.0
2
6
6
)
(0
.0
3
7
9
)
(0
.0
3
6
5
)
8
4
.6
2
9
.2
6
6
.1
2
6
2
.1
4
2
3
.1
2
1
4
.7
4
9
0
th
0
.8
0
5
0
.6
9
1
0
.0
9
2
0
.0
2
2
0
.4
4
4
0
.3
4
9
0
.0
8
0
0
.0
1
4
-
-
-
-
(0
.0
3
5
8
)
(0
.0
4
5
0
)
(0
.0
3
4
3
)
(0
.0
3
9
7
)
8
5
.8
6
1
1
.3
9
2
.7
4
7
8
.7
0
1
8
.0
6
3
.2
5
2
0
1
0
-1
1
1
0
th
0
.6
2
4
0
.3
0
6
0
.2
7
6
0
.0
4
2
0
.5
8
3
0
.1
5
1
0
.3
9
3
0
.0
4
0
0
.4
0
1
0
.2
4
6
0
.1
6
6
-0
.0
1
0
(0
.0
4
5
4
)
(0
.0
4
1
0
)
(0
.0
4
4
5
)
(0
.0
5
1
7
)
(0
.0
4
8
1
)
(0
.0
3
8
4
)
4
8
.9
5
4
4
.2
7
6
.7
8
2
5
.8
0
6
7
.3
2
6
.8
8
6
1
.2
8
4
1
.3
1
-2
.5
9
5
0
th
1
.0
5
0
0
.6
2
7
0
.3
6
5
0
.0
5
7
0
.8
7
6
0
.3
5
4
0
.4
4
5
0
.0
7
7
0
.9
7
3
0
.4
8
6
0
.3
5
7
0
.1
3
0
(0
.0
4
0
8
)
(0
.0
3
0
6
)
(0
.0
4
5
7
)
(0
.0
3
9
0
)
(0
.0
4
4
8
)
(0
.0
3
1
3
)
5
9
.7
6
3
4
.7
6
5
.4
7
4
0
.4
2
5
0
.8
1
8
.7
7
4
9
.9
2
3
6
.7
3
1
3
.3
5
9
0
th
0
.7
0
9
0
.5
2
8
0
.2
9
3
-0
.1
1
3
0
.4
3
7
0
.2
3
0
0
.2
0
8
-0
.0
0
1
0
.5
3
0
0
.3
8
0
0
.2
3
9
-0
.0
9
0
(0
.0
3
3
6
)
(0
.0
5
0
3
)
(0
.0
3
5
3
)
(0
.0
3
8
7
)
(0
.0
3
6
2
)
(0
.0
4
1
3
)
7
4
.5
0
4
1
.4
0
-1
5
.8
9
5
2
.6
2
4
7
.5
9
-0
.2
1
7
1
.7
7
4
5
.1
3
-1
6
.9
1
M
a
t
c
h
e
d
1
9
9
3
-9
4
1
0
th
0
.1
5
4
0
.1
2
2
0
.0
3
4
-0
.0
0
2
0
.0
6
9
0
.0
5
7
0
.0
1
8
-0
.0
0
7
-
-
-
-
(0
.0
5
4
)
(0
.0
4
9
)
(0
.0
3
7
)
(0
.0
2
9
)
7
9
2
2
-1
8
3
2
6
-1
0
5
0
th
0
.6
2
4
0
.5
3
6
0
.0
4
9
0
.0
3
9
0
.2
2
3
0
.1
8
4
0
.1
3
3
-0
.0
9
4
-
-
-
-
(0
.0
3
7
)
(0
.0
2
2
)
(0
.0
3
2
)
(0
.0
2
6
)
8
6
8
6
8
2
6
0
-4
2
9
0
th
0
.6
6
2
0
.5
1
9
0
.1
0
9
0
.0
3
5
0
.4
6
9
0
.3
7
2
0
.1
1
5
-0
.0
1
8
-
-
-
-
(0
.0
4
0
)
(0
.0
4
8
)
(0
.0
4
2
)
(0
.0
4
8
)
7
8
1
6
5
7
9
2
4
-4
2
0
1
0
-1
1
1
0
th
0
.4
9
1
0
.1
1
9
0
.3
2
9
0
.0
4
2
0
.5
1
1
0
.0
3
3
0
.3
8
4
0
.0
9
4
0
.2
6
0
0
.0
6
5
0
.1
6
6
0
.0
2
8
(0
.0
3
8
)
(0
.0
3
4
)
(0
.0
3
7
)
(0
.0
3
9
)
(0
.0
4
1
)
(0
.0
4
2
)
2
4
6
7
9
6
7
5
1
8
2
5
6
4
1
1
5
0
th
0
.4
0
5
0
.2
0
5
0
.2
4
8
-0
.0
4
7
0
.4
3
2
0
.0
8
1
0
.3
3
5
0
.0
1
6
0
.4
9
0
0
.2
0
1
0
.2
9
3
-0
.0
0
3
(0
.0
2
7
)
(0
.0
2
5
)
(0
.0
2
0
)
(0
.0
2
0
)
(0
.0
3
3
)
(0
.0
2
3
)
5
0
6
1
-1
2
1
9
7
7
4
4
1
6
0
-1
9
0
th
0
.6
9
3
0
.2
8
8
0
.4
0
8
-0
.0
0
3
0
.7
7
8
0
.1
6
3
0
.4
9
9
0
.1
1
6
0
.6
6
5
0
.2
3
9
0
.3
2
2
0
.1
0
5
(0
.0
5
1
)
(0
.0
3
3
)
(0
.0
5
0
)
(0
.0
4
2
)
(0
.0
6
5
)
(0
.0
6
2
)
4
2
5
9
0
2
1
6
4
1
5
3
6
4
8
1
6
N
o
te
:
(i
)
b
o
o
ts
tr
a
p
st
a
n
d
a
rd
e
rr
o
rs
a
re
in
p
a
re
n
th
e
si
s
a
n
d
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
to
o
b
se
rv
e
d
g
a
p
a
re
m
e
n
ti
o
n
e
d
u
n
d
e
r
st
a
n
d
a
rd
e
rr
o
rs
.
(i
i)
†-
c
a
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s
a
re
n
o
t
p
o
ss
ib
le
d
u
e
to
u
n
a
v
a
il
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
O
B
C
d
a
ta
.
21
6 Conclusions
Fast-paced growth without stability is not sustainable. Although India’s recent growth success
story has motivated academics and policy makers to predict a faster pace of convergence in per
capita income to the developed country’s growth path within a time frame of less than three
decades, the observed rise social and economic differential in development has been a source of
worry. Against this backdrop, this paper has investigated how wage differential across younger
and older cohorts and socially segmented groups has widened over time. Indeed, we argued that
rising inequality between young and old cohorts and between social groups meant that anger
and agonies among the individuals might trigger social tension and uncertain economic growth.
This is especially important if young cohorts feel the heat of rising social segmentation in terms
of social and economic opportunities.
An important emphasis of the paper is quantifying the effects of caste discrimination by
focusing exclusively on the cohorts’ demographic distinctions, viz., young and old. Both demo-
graphic cohorts possess their own social affiliations and we hold that this has been endogenously
determined within the Indian context, viz., whether they belong to a high or low caste. Had
the effect of caste discrimination been felt equally across demographic distribution the situation
would have been different. By contrast, we have demonstrated and argued in this paper that
the impact of caste discrimination has been felt more acutely among younger than the older age
cohorts.
From a temporal perspective, this paper finds that there is a strong presence of discrimi-
natory practices in India over the period 2010-11 compared to 1993-94. Our finding thus raises
an important question: whether the increasing effect of caste discrimination among all social
groups is due to less effectiveness of the government’s affirmative policies per se or the notable
division of labour between high caste and lower caste since independence. More importantly, our
results indicate that the prevalence of caste discrimination among all social groups has remained
constant compared to the transition phase. While analyzing the effect of discrimination between
young and old cohorts, we find that the existence of social practices, historical juncture and so-
cioeconomic realities has reinforced or reshaped the nexus of caste-class relations in India. The
distributional effect of age and the nexus of caste discrimination, thus, draw attention towards
more studies. The effect of rising discrimination over time and more discrimination between
younger and older workers reinforces the need for policymakers to review the existing affirma-
tive policies for lower social groups and in particular pay attention to the plight of younger
workers in those groups. Inclusive demography-driven affirmative policies may prove helpful in
light of our findings.
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7 Appendix
 Machado and Mata (2005) Algorithm
Let w(τ), x(τ), τ = hc, lc denote wage distribution and the m covariates of group τ . Let g(x; τ)
be the joint density of the covariates for group (τ). To generate a random sample for the wage
density that would prevail for group (τ) if the conditional fitted model 5 were true and the
covariates were distributed as g(x; τ) . This can be described as follows:
Step 1 Generate a random sample of size m from a uniform (0,1): θ1, θ2, θ3 . . . θm
Step 2 For the data set for group τ (denoted by x(τ), a nτ x k matrix of data on the covariates)
, and each θi estimate
Qθ(w|x : τ)
which yields m estimates of the QR coefficients ˆβ(θ)
Step 3 Generate a random sample of size m with replacement from the rows of the covariate
matrix x(τ) : x∗i (τ), i = 1, 2, 3, . . .m.
Step 4 Finally
y∗i (τ) = x
∗
i (τ)
′ ˆβ(θi)
m
i=1
is a random sample of size m from the desired distribution.
To construct the counterfactual density i.e., the density function of wage distribution for
high caste corresponding to low caste distribution of covariates, we follow the algorithm above
for hc, but in step 3, instead of drawing the sample from hc covariate xhc, we replace the drawn
sample with xlc. After obtaining the desired counterfactual densities, we decompose the overall
difference in wage between both groups in two parts: a part attribute to the coefficients and
another to the covariates plus the residual term.
In equational form, let f(whc) denote the estimate of the marginal density of wage for the
high caste based on the observed sample, and f∗(whc) denote the density of wage for high caste
based on the generated sample. Under counterfactual distribution assumption, we may have
f∗(whc;xlc) that would have prevailed if all covariates would have been distributed as in low
25
caste and the wage structure as in high caste. Under this assumption, the MM decomposition
can written as:
f(whc)− f(wlc) = f∗(whc;xlc)− f∗(wlc)︸ ︷︷ ︸
coefficienteffect
+ f∗(whc)− f∗(whc;xlc)︸ ︷︷ ︸
covariateeffect
+residual (7)
 N˜opo (2008) matching approach
The N˜opo matching approach can be performed in the following way
– Step 1: Select one low caste individual from the sample (without replacement).
– Step 2: Select all the upper caste individuals that have the same characteristics as
the low caste individual previously selected.
– Step 3: With all the individuals selected in step 2, construct a synthetic individual
whose wage is the average of all of them and match him to the original low caste.
– Step 4: Put the observations of both individuals (the synthetic upper caste and low
caste) in their respective new samples of matched individuals.
– Repeat steps 1 through 4 until exhausting the original low caste sample.
The new data set contains the observations of matched upper caste and low caste indi-
viduals based on the same empirical distribution of probabilities for characteristics. The
advantage of such matching approach is that the modelling assumption that with the same
individuals with the same observable characteristics should be paid the same regardless of
their social status.
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